R. William Johnstone served at the transportation protection employees of the Sep 11 fee, and wrote this booklet to construct upon and complement the Commission's paintings. In its pages, he explains the aviation defense approach failure on Sept. 11, makes use of that as a method for comparing post-9/11 transportation safety efforts, and proposes treatments to endured shortcomings.9/11 and the way forward for Transportation safety is predicated on info initially supplied to the Sept. 11 fee, augmented via unpublished experiences and a wealth of alternative fabric that has come to gentle because the issuance of the Commission's personal file in July 2004. half One analyzes the aviation defense system's historical past and associations to provide an explanation for why the process failed on 9-11. half seems at what has been performed in aviation and transportation safety due to the fact that Sep 11, together with the Commission's innovations and the congressional reaction to them. eventually and most importantly, half 3 outlines a recommended strategy for making improvements to present U.S. transportation safeguard. It starts off with basic coverage questions that has to be replied if we're to optimize transportation safety efforts, and concludes with either underlying ideas for motion and particular thoughts.
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Extra info for 9 11 and the Future of Transportation Security
Airliners who were determined and highly motivated, and therefore largely immune to whatever “deterrent” value was possessed by the civil aviation security system, who escaped notice in FAA Security Directives (which essentially supplied the pre-9/11 “no ﬂy” lists for the air carriers),11 who used as weapons items with a metal content less than that of a handgun, and who did not conform to the traditional, nonsuicide hijacking paradigm were likely to succeed. Why Did the System Fail? Having considered the civil aviation security system’s history and major features, we can now return to the central question posed at the outset: Why did that system fail on 9/11?
S. ” Finally, it called for a series of measures to rapidly improve the security system, via the timely deployment of available technologies (including liquid explosives scanning devices and trace portals for the larger airports), and “institutional and procedural changes” in the system (including expansion of the Federal Security Manager program, designation by air carriers and airport operators of a security head “who should be a senior management ofﬁcial,” and streamlining the rule-making process for security).
33 Does all of this mean that the 9/11 failure of the civil aviation security system was inevitable, and that, in a sense, everyone was to blame? I believe the answer is no, on both counts. A key attribute of any system of governance must be accountability, that both those in charge and those who carry out their orders are held to account for their actions. In the ﬁrst place, as previously mentioned, the 9/11 hijackers made many mistakes along the way and there were a number of individuals— ranging from ticket counter personnel, to checkpoint screeners, to air trafﬁc controllers, to FAA security ofﬁcials, and many others—who were in a position where they could have hampered, mitigated, or even prevented one or more of the hijackings.
9 11 and the Future of Transportation Security by Johnstone